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One of the problems facing the criminal justice system is unwarranted disparity as a result of unbridled discretion. 
Although disparity, by itself, does not necessarily indicate a problem in the criminal justice system, disparity 
unwarranted does present a problem.  Disparity becomes unwarranted when, controlling for legal factors, extralegal 
factors such as race/ethnicity, gender, and age influence court processing decisions.  The greater the discretion one 
possesses, the higher the likelihood of unwarranted disparity in one’s decisions (Albonetti, 1991; Meeker, Jesilow, 
& Aranda, 1992; Bushway & Piehl, 2001). Within the criminal court system, judicial discretion in sentencing has 
received the most scrutiny. 
 
More than thirty years ago, there was a call to reform the indeterminate sentencing schemes used in the 1970s 
(Spohn, 2002).  One of the suggestions was to implement a sentencing guideline system where judges’ sentencing 
decisions would be streamlined by funneling sentences through a matrix system, cross-sectioning offense severity 
and prior record level.  There were many goals to the sentencing guidelines.  One of those goals was to reduce 
unwarranted sentencing disparity brought on by unfettered discretion judges had in indeterminate sentencing (Hofer, 
Loeffler, Blackwell, & Valentino, 2004). Certainty of punishment, therefore, was more important than the autonomy 
of judges, given this new reform.  The sentence guideline system attempted to increase the transparency and 
rationality of punishment (Hofer et al, 2004).  
 
One of the purposes of sentencing guidelines was to reduce discretion – and, thereby, unwarranted disparity (see 
Spohn, 2000; Tonry, 1996).  One area of discretion that judges retained was in the area of departure sentencing.  In 
other words, judges could, given particular circumstances, depart from the sentence guideline range.  An upward 
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departure – or, aggravated sentence – can occur if the judge deemed it to be appropriate to raise the sentence above 
the guideline range maximum.  A downward departure – or, mitigated sentence – can occur if the judge deemed it to 
be appropriate to lower the sentence below the guideline range maximum.  Until recently, the decision of an upward 
departure was left in the hands of the judge. 
 
Recently, the practice of raising the sentence above the guideline range maximum was put into question by the 
United States Supreme Court in Blakely v. Washington (2004). The United States Supreme Court ruled that, while 
upward departures are still allowed, a jury must now decide the facts upon which an upward departure is made 
rather than relying on the sole discretional authority of the judge. Prior to Blakely, the judge, under the guise of 
judicial discretion, would consider certain factors during the sentencing phase.  These facts may or may not have 
been substantiated by the rigors of the guilt phase of the trial.  The Court ruled that this practice violated the 
defendant’s right to a jury trial and required that these facts be proven by the same standard as any other facts during 
the guilt phase – that is, beyond a reasonable doubt.  This ruling, therefore, limited the little discretional authority 
the judge might have had (see McVoy, 2005; Wool & Stemen, 2004). “If state and federal sentencing guidelines 
represented a revolution in sentencing theory and practice, then Blakely, it is feared, will spark a counter-revolution” 
(Frase, 2007, 404). 
 
Given that judicial discretion and disparate decisions are linked in sentencing reforms (see Spohn, 2000) and given 
that the Blakely decision further limited judicial discretion (McVoy, 2005; Wool & Stemen, 2004), research is 
needed to address discretion and the potential for a decrease in disparities in aggravated sentencing decisions after 
the Blakely decision compared to before Blakely. Although there has been a fair amount of empirical research on 
unwarranted disparities in aggravated sentencing decisions and a fair amount of legal commentaries on the Blakely 
decision, to date, there has been no empirical, systematic study of the connection of the two – that is, the connection 
of the Blakely ruling and disparities in aggravated sentencing. This study serves as an explorative first step in 
examining upward departures and the potential disparate pitfalls that might exist before Blakely but not after 
Blakely.  
 
Research on Aggravated Sentencing 
 
Although there has been no empirical research on the effect of Blakely on departure decisions, there has been 
research on departure decisions prior to this ruling. Since the Supreme Court ruled on aggravated sentences, the 
review of literature only addresses upward departures. A few interesting findings on downward departure decisions 
are footnoted. Legal factors have a major role in whether a judge aggravates the sentence above the sentence 
guideline range maximum.  Engen, Gainey, Crutchfield, and Weis (2003) studied aggravated sentences in the state 
of Washington where they found that legal variables – offense severity and prior record level – increased the odds of 
an upward departure.
2
   In other words, defendants with a more serious offense and/or prior record are more likely to 
receive an aggravated sentence. 
 
Johnson (2003) examined departure sentencing in Pennsylvania and found that legal variables have a statistically 
significant effect on upward departures albeit in a direction that was unexpected. They found that an increase in 
offense severity or an increase in the defendant’s prior record led to a decrease in the odds of an upward departure 
(Johnson, 2003). Examining sentencing under the Pennsylvania sentencing guidelines, Kramer and Ulmer (2002) 
suggested that courtroom actors may not agree with the harshness of the penalty or view these defendants as less 
blameworthy and, therefore, adjust their decision (charging, plea bargaining or sentencing) to coincide with their 
beliefs. 
 
Some research has identified mode of conviction as an important factor influencing aggravated sentencing.  Engen 
and his colleagues (2003) found that those who were convicted at trial had a greater chance of receiving an upward 
departure than those who pled guilty.  In studying these same effects in Pennsylvania, Kramer and Ulmer (1996) 
found that defendants convicted at trial receive, on average, a larger magnitude of aggravated sentence than either 
those convicted in a bench trial or those who pled guilty. 
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Research has also suggested that other extralegal factors influence the decision to aggravate sentences. Engen and 
his colleagues (2003) concluded that race and/or ethnicity had significant yet mixed effects on upward departures. 
The odds that Hispanic defendants received an upward departure was 68% higher than the odds for white 
defendants, whereas the odds that black defendants received an upward departure was 35% lower than the odds for 
white defendants (Engen et al., 2003). Unlike Engen et al. (2003), however, Johnson (2003) found that race 
positively affected upward departures. Johnson (2003) found that black defendants were more likely to receive an 
upward departure whereas Engen et al.(2003) found that black defendants were less likely to receive an upward 
departure.  Johnson (2003) suggested that judges perceive racial minorities as more of a threat and less likely to be 
rehabilitated than white defendants.  
 
Prior research also studied whether gender is related to the sentencing departure decision. Engen and his colleagues 
(2003) found that gender had no statistically significant effect on the likelihood of upward departure sentencing.
3
  
On the other hand, Johnson (2003) found that male defendants were statistically more likely to receive upward 
departures than female defendants, linking to the judicial perception of blameworthiness and dangerousness.  
 
Research has also outlined the relationship of age and departure sentencing.  Engen and his colleagues (2003) found 
a statistically significant relationship between age and upward departures, finding that older defendants were more 
likely to receive upward departures than younger defendants. Johnson (2003) found a dissimilar finding for upward 
departures in that older defendants were less likely to receive an upward departure than younger defendants. He 
suggested that younger defendants likely carry a stigma that leads judges to be more punitive (Johnson, 2003). 
 
The research indicates that there is a relationship between legal variables – namely, offense severity and prior record 
level – and the decision to depart from the sentencing guideline range.  There is some – albeit mixed – evidence that 
extralegal factors have an effect on the aggravated sentence decision.  The question, though, is whether the recent 
Supreme Court ruling in Blakely v. Washington (2004) impacted upward departure decisions. Given the greater 
restraint on judicial discretion and the formalized rules on sentencing in Blakely v. Washington (2004), the impact of 
these extralegal factors on upward departures should be minimized after Blakely compared to before Blakely 
 
The Sentencing Guidelines and the United States Supreme Court 
 
Three landmark United States Supreme Court cases set the stage for a study of upward departure sentencing. In 
1989, the United States Supreme Court, in Mistretta v. United States (1989), ruled that sentencing guidelines were 
constitutional and did not violate the separation of powers clause in the United States Constitution. The Supreme 
Court did not address the constitutionality of sentencing guidelines or decisions within sentencing guidelines states
4
 
until their landmark ruling in Blakely v. Washington (2004). 
 
Apprendi v. New Jersey 530 U.S. 466 (2000) 
 
Before outlining the ruling in Blakely, it is imperative to summarize the Supreme Court ruling in Apprendi v. New 
Jersey which set the precedent for Blakely. Charles Apprendi fired shots into the home of a black family. He was 
charged with and pled guilty to second-degree possession of a firearm for unlawful purpose. This offense carried 
with it a five to ten year prison sentence. Originally, the state did not charge Apprendi with a hate crime, which 
would allow for an enhanced sentence. After Apprendi pled guilty, the prosecutor filed a motion to enhance the 
sentence because of the racial motivation of the case. The judge found, by preponderance of the evidence, that the 
crime was racially motivated and sentenced Apprendi to twelve years in prison, two years over the statutory 
maximum of the original charges.  
 
Apprendi appealed, suggesting that any fact presented to the court which increases the statutory maximum for which 
a defendant was already charged and convicted violated his right to a jury trial granted to him under the Sixth 
Amendment. The Supreme Court agreed and ruled that the United States Constitution required that any fact that may 
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increase the penalty of a crime beyond the maximum sentence already set forth by statute must be both submitted to 
a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The only exception to this rule is evidence of prior convictions. The 
ruling in Apprendi set the stage for the decision in Blakely. 
 
Blakely v. Washington 542 U.S. 296 (2004) 
 
Unlike Apprendi, which focused on sentencing above the statutory maximum, Blakely focused on sentencing above 
the guideline maximum. Ralph Blakely, Jr. was married to his wife Yolanda for 25 years. Complications arose, 
which led to Yolanda filing for divorce. In 1998, Blakely kidnapped Yolanda from their home in the state of 
Washington, bound her with duct tape, and forced her into a wooden box in his truck. Blakely took Yolanda to a 
friend’s house in Montana, where he was arrested.  
 
Blakely eventually pled guilty to second-degree kidnapping involving both domestic violence and the use of a 
firearm. These charges carried a maximum sentence of 53 months according to the sentencing guidelines in the state 
of Washington. The judge, however, after hearing Yolanda’s testimony and the cruelty that was involved, imposed 
an aggravated sentence of 90 months. Blakely appealed, arguing that this sentence deprived him of his constitutional 
right to have a jury decide all legally relevant factors that may affect his sentence. The Court agreed, applying the 
precedent set forth in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000). The facts were neither admitted by the defendant nor 
submitted to the jury, leading the Court to rule that his Sixth Amendment rights had been violated. The judge could 
not impose a sentence above the prescribed sentence guideline range maximum in violation of his Sixth Amendment 
rights. 
 
Blakely v. Washington (2004), thus, followed in the footsteps of Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) by upholding the 
Sixth Amendment rights of the defendant. Judges were no longer to depart above the guideline range maximum 
unless a jury hears and admits all the sentencing factors of the case. The only exception to this is when a judge 
considers prior felony convictions. 
 
The Impact of Blakely v. Washington 
 
The impact of Blakely cannot be taken for granted. Berman (2005) concluded that “Blakely may be the most 
consequential and important criminal justice decision not just in recent terms, not just on the Rehnquist Court, but 
perhaps in the history of the Supreme Court” (p. 41). Although the use of aggravated sentencing is not typical, its 
immediate effects were widespread. Within weeks, state courts and lower federal courts were already ruling that the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional based on the precedent set in Blakely and Apprendi (Berman, 
2005). 
 
Bowman (2004) suggested that “[Blakely] really is unprecedented in effect. No Supreme Court opinion in living 
memory, perhaps no opinion in American history, has caused near-paralysis of either state or federal criminal justice 
systems by placing the outcome of every case in doubt” (p. 252). Some have suggested, therefore, that presumptive 
sentencing guidelines should simply be voluntary instead (Frase, 2007).  One of the main problems with Blakely is 
the directional bias it now imposes on the right to jury trial (Bowman, 2004). Juries are now required to find facts 
that increase a sentence above the guideline range maximum, yet the Court in Blakely does no give the jury the right 
to determine facts that either set a defendants’ minimum sentence or mitigate a defendants’ presumptive sentence.  
 
 
CURRENT STUDY 
 
The purpose of the current study is to explore the potential effect of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Blakely v. 
Washington on upward departures from the sentencing guidelines. Prior research suggested both legal and extralegal 
factors may play a role when a judge decides to depart from the guidelines. One of the purposes of the sentencing 
guidelines was to reduce discretion and increase certainty of punishment (Spohn, 2000).  Given that judges, prior to  
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Blakely, had discretional authority to aggravate sentences above the sentencing guideline range maximum and that 
discretion may lead to reliance on extralegal factors, this study examines upward departures both before and after 
the Blakely decision to reveal any potential reduction in unwarranted disparity in upward departure decisions in the 
state of Washington.
5
 
 
Hypotheses 
 
Since judicial discretion is further limited given the ruling in Blakely, it is hypothesized that aggravated sentences 
are less common after the decision in Blakely compared to before this decision.  Another set of hypotheses is related 
to prior research that suggested that judges take numerous legal and extralegal variables into account in their 
sentencing decisions. The focal concerns theory (see Steffensmeier et al., 1998) suggests that judges view particular 
defendants to be more blameworthy and/or more dangerous than other defendants. It is the contention, given the 
ruling in Blakely, that judges are more likely to impose an upward departure for minority defendants, for younger 
defendants, and for male defendants prior to Blakely but not after Blakely.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The current study examines sentencing data collected from the state of Washington to study whether or not the 
decision of Blakely v. Washington (2004) affects the likelihood of upward departures. The sample for this study is 
drawn from all sentencing decisions in felony cases resulting in a guilty decision in the state of Washington.
6
  A pre-
test/post-test research design is employed, examining cases decided within twenty-seven months
7
 before Blakely 
(pre-Blakely hereafter) and twenty-seven months after Blakely (post-Blakely hereafter). Blakely v. Washington was 
decided on June 24, 2004; therefore, this study encompasses cases from March 2002 to May 2004 representing pre-
Blakely and cases from July 2004 until October 2006 representing post-Blakely.  
 
Since the population of cases includes mostly non-aggravated sentences (over 98%), a disproportionate stratified 
sample was used.  A disproportionate stratified sample takes “a larger than proportionate number of certain groups 
to assure the appearance of a sufficient number of cases for comparative purposes of a group that is small in the 
population. (Hagan, 2005, p. 136; see also Champion, 2006; Maxfield & Babbie, 2008).  “[I]f only a small number 
of people in a population exhibit some attribute or characteristic of interest, then a large sample must be drawn to 
produce adequate numbers of elements that exhibit the uncommon condition.” (Maxfield & Babbie, 2008, p. 229).  
Several studies have utilized this approach comparing degrees earned by inmates while incarcerated (Batiuk, Lahm, 
Mckeever, Wilcox, & Wilcox, 2005), attitudes towards juvenile death penalty among different racial/ethnic groups 
(Vogel & Vogel, 2003), executed sentences before and after the imposition of the sentencing guidelines in 
Minnesota (Miethe, 1987), juvenile referrals among different racial/ethnic categories (Leiber, 1993), and 
punishment severity of illegal aliens and non-illegal aliens (McShane, 1987) 
 
The current study uses a disproportionate stratified sampling procedure to produce a higher proportion of cases 
resulting in an aggravated sentence compared to their representation in the population of cases.  For the overall 
sample of cases in the 52-month period surrounding the Blakely decision, the population of cases resulting in an 
aggravated sentence (or, upward departure) is included and an equal number of randomly selected cases resulting in 
a non-aggravated sentence are included in the analyses.
8
  The purpose of using this sampling procedure is two-fold.  
First, the sampling procedure allows for heterogeneity in the variable of interest.  With only 1.9% of the cases 
resulting in an aggravated sentence in the overall population, the dependent variable is homogenous and appears to  
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 Since the current study examines data in the state of Washington, it is possible the findings in the current study 
might be applicable only to Washington and not other sentencing guideline states.  The explorative nature of this 
study should lend support to other relevant examinations in other sentencing guideline states.  This limitation is 
further addressed in the discussion section. 
6
 The limited data were provided by the Sentencing Guidelines Commission of Washington. 
7
 The initial proposal for this project was presented in October 2006 which necessitated a 27 month pre- and post-
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8
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be more like a constant than a variable.  Second, using the entire population of cases arguably results in masked 
findings.  The sheer number of cases resulting in a non-aggravated sentence overwhelms potentially important 
influences on upward departures before and after Blakely. 
 
Variables 
 
The dependent variable for this study is whether or not a case received an aggravated sentence – identified as an 
“exceptional sentence” in the state of Washington. Upward departures (or aggravated sentences) were coded as one 
and all other sentences – within or below the sentence guideline range – were coded as zero.  
 
Several legal and/or extralegal variables are included to examine potential effects on the decision to depart above the 
sentencing guideline range maximum. Due to the explorative purpose of this research and the secondary nature of 
the data, other relevant factors – such as type of current offense – were not made available.  This is a limitation of 
this current study, but it is believed that some important first steps can be taken in exploring this field of study. The 
legal variables in this study are the severity of the current offense and prior record level.  The severity of the current 
offense is measured by the offense score (range = 0-15) as determined by the sentencing guidelines in the state of 
Washington.  A higher offense severity score indicates a more severe current offense.  The prior record level is 
measured by the prior record score which is a ranked value of the offender’s prior convictions (range = 0-9) rather 
than a count of prior convictions.  This prior record score is determined by a calculus provided by the Sentencing 
Commission in the state of Washington.  This calculus
9
 consists of four general variables: adult history, juvenile 
history, other current offenses, and the status of the offender. The number of convictions – usually felony – or 
factors at each stage is multiplied (or weighted) by the severity of those convictions (e.g. serious violent, other 
violent, non-violent) or factors.  The total number for each of these categories is then summed to obtain the prior 
record score – called an “offender score.”  Calculations can be oriented differently based on the type of current 
offense conviction.  A higher prior record score indicates a higher prior record level. 
 
The current study also includes several extralegal variables that may affect a judge’s decision to increase the 
sentence above the sentencing guideline range maximum. The extralegal variables that are included in this study are 
race/ethnicity, age, gender, and mode of conviction. Race/ethnicity is coded as a dummy variable: white, black, 
Hispanic, and other.  In the multivariate analysis, “white” is the reference category against which the other 
categories are compared.  Mode of conviction is a dichotomous variable measuring whether the defendant was found 
guilty in a bench/jury trial or pled guilty.   
 
Along with basic descriptive analyses, three logistic regression analyses are run:  baseline model with a pre-post 
variable included, pre-Blakely model, and post-Blakely model. This analysis allows for comparisons of the effects of 
the extralegal variables on the decision to impose an upward departure before and after Blakely.  Additionally, a 
comparison of significant unstandardized coefficients is conducted by running a differences in slopes test for 
independent samples (see Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle, & Piquero, 1998).  This analysis allows for a comparison 
between the significant findings in the pre-Blakely period and the post-Blakely period to test whether one significant 
factor has a stronger effect on the dependent variable for one sample compared to the other sample. This test, if 
successful, might indicate that the effect of post-Blakely factors may have a weaker hold on upward departures 
compared to the same pre-Blakely factors despite there being significance in both samples 
 
Since the data are limited to what was provided, the strength of the findings is somewhat limited. However, to date, 
no empirical analysis has explored the effect of Blakely on sentence guideline departures using a pre-test and post-
test design. Therefore, this study will shed some light on an area of study not already explored. 
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FINDINGS 
 
The overall sample from which this study further partitioned consists of 116,274 cases and includes approximately 
80% male defendants. The majority of defendants are white (77%), while blacks made up 14% and Hispanics 4% of 
the sample. The average age of the individuals in this overall sample is approximately 34 years old. The vast 
majority of cases resulted in a guilty plea (96%) and approximately 2% resulted in an aggravated sentence – or, 
upward departure. 
 
 
The partitioned baseline sample is similar to the larger sample in every way except the percentage of aggravated 
sentences.  More specifically, the baseline sample includes 50% cases resulting in an aggravated sentence and 50% 
cases resulting in a non-aggravated sentence.  See Table 1 for a summary of the descriptive statistics for the baseline 
sample. The vast majority of defendants are male (82.8%) and white (77.3%) with 13.5% black and 4.5% Hispanic. 
The average age in the baseline sample is approximately 35 years old and most cases resulted in a guilty plea (95%).   
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Due to the pre-test, post-test design of the study, it is important to address important differences in the makeup of 
cases adjudicated in Washington before and after the Supreme Court ruling in Blakely v. Washington. Table 2 
highlights the descriptive statistics of both the pre- and post-Blakely samples. The pre-Blakely sample includes 2,709 
cases. Over half of the pre-Blakely sample resulted in an upward departure.  Similar to the baseline and overall 
sample, 77.3% of the defendants are white, 13.4% are black, and 4.6% are Hispanic. The pre-Blakely sample is 
mostly male (83.4%), similar to the percentages found in the baseline and overall samples. The average age of this 
sample is approximately 36 years old, and the vast majority of the pre-Blakely sample pled guilty (93.6%).  
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
In the post-Blakely sample, there is a decrease in the percentage of cases resulting in an upward departure (41.4%).  
This decrease might be an effect of the Supreme Court decision in Blakely v. Washington. In the post-Blakely 
sample most of the defendants are male (81.9%) and white (77.3%) with black defendants making up 13.6% and 
Hispanic defendants making up 4.2% of the sample. The average age is only slightly younger – approximately 34 
years old. There are slightly more cases that resulted in a guilty plea (97.5%) compared to the pre-Blakely sample 
which may indicate a trend that the prosecutor has a bigger role in plea bargaining cases that would likely garner an 
upward departure.  
 
Multivariate Analyses 
 
Logistic regression is used to examine the effects of offender characteristics on upward departures, controlling for 
legally relevant factors. Logistic regression is run to account for the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable 
(Menard, 2002). These analyses are run for the baseline sample as well as for the pre- and post-Blakely samples. The 
current study also conducts a differences in slopes test between the pre-Blakely and post-Blakely samples to make an 
inferred conclusion of the impact of the Blakely decision on the determinants of upward departure decision-making.  
If the differences in slopes test is found to be statistically significant, then it can be suggested that a variable has a 
stronger or weaker influence in one sample compared to the other sample.  Given that the major difference between 
the two samples is whether the sample was taken before or after the Blakely decision, it can be suggested that the 
influence is uniquely tied to the Supreme Court ruling in Blakely. However, the power of this conclusion is 
somewhat limited due to the limited number of factors taken into consideration. 
Baseline Model 
 
The model for the baseline sample indicates that all legal and some of the extralegal factors are found to be 
statistically significant (p <. 05).  The findings from the baseline regression analyses summarized in Table 3 indicate 
that there is a statistically significant (p < .05) decrease in the use of upward departures.  In fact, the odds of a case 
receiving an upward departure after the Blakely decision is 69% less than the odds of receiving an upward departure 
before the Blakely decision.  Table 3 shows that offense severity and prior record level have a positively significant 
impact on the decision to aggravate the sentence.  As expected, when the offense severity and/or prior record level 
increase, the likelihood of an upward departure increases.  Most of the extralegal variables – gender, age, and mode 
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of conviction – are also found to have a positively significant impact on upward departures.  For the most part, race 
and/or ethnicity were found not to have an effect on the decision to aggravate the sentence (p > .05). The largest 
substantive effect of a particular variable on the aggravated sentence decision is gender.  Male defendants are almost 
twice as likely to receive an upward departure as female defendants. 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
Pre-Blakely Model 
 
Similar to the baseline model, the pre-Blakely model only has a 4.7% reduction in error (Nagelkerke R
2
 = 0.047) 
which indicates that important factors are not considered in model construction.  This problem, though, is typical of 
explorative research and secondary data analysis. The statistically significant factors (p < .05) in this sample are 
prior record, age, and gender. Male defendants are over twice as likely to receive an upward departure as female 
defendants (odds ratio = 2.038).  The substantive effects of prior record and age are minimal.  Unlike the baseline 
model, though, offense severity and “other race/ethnicity” is not a statistically significant effect (p > .05).   
 
Post-Blakely Model 
 
The findings for the post-Blakely sample are also included in Table 3.  The statistically significant predictors (p < 
.05) of the upward departure decision after the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington in 2004 are prior 
record, age, gender, and whether the defendant’s race/ethnicity was characterized as “other” or not.  The most 
substantive of these effects is whether the defendant’s race/ethnicity category was “other” or not.  Defendants who 
are in the “other” racial/ethnic category are approximately two times less likely to receive an upward departure 
(odds ratio = 0.517) than white defendants.
10
  Male defendants are over 1 ½ times more likely to receive an 
aggravated sentence above the sentence guideline range maximum than female defendants (odds ratio = 1.774).  
Although statistically significant, the prior record level and age of the defendant yields little substantive influence on 
predicting whether the particular defendant receives an upward departure or not. 
 
Since a few of the extralegal variables are statistically significant in both the pre-Blakely sample and the post-
Blakely sample, the differences in slopes test can be used to compare the unstandardized effects of the same variable 
between independent samples (see Paternoster et al., 1998). This test can further articulate whether (and which) 
significant factors have more influence in one sample compared to another sample. The samples, in this instance, are 
cases before Blakely and cases after Blakely. These results are summarized in Table 4.  
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
The results of this analysis indicate that the test did not provide a statically significant difference in the influence of 
these variables between the pre-Blakely and post-Blakely samples.  However, it should be noted that the z score for 
prior record is positive and the z scores for each of the included extralegal variables are negative.  A positive z score 
in this analysis indicates that the variable has stronger influence in the post-Blakely sample than in the pre-Blakely 
sample, whereas a negative z score indicates that the variable has a weaker influence in the post-Blakely sample than 
in the pre-Blakely sample. Therefore, the legal variable included in this test is “approaching” stronger influence and 
the extralegal variables are “approaching” weaker influence after Blakely compared to before Blakely. It should be 
cautioned, though, that the z scores were still found not to be statistically significant.  Therefore, the formal 
conclusion is that there is no difference of influence between the independent samples.  From a theoretical 
standpoint, though, the direction of the z score is an important one to note. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The Supreme Court in Blakely v. Washington limited judicial discretion – even further than the sentencing 
guidelines themselves.  One of the purposes of sentencing guidelines was to limit discretion and reduce unwarranted 
disparity.  Given this ruling, it was suggested that the likelihood of upward departure sentencing – an area of judicial 
discretion still remaining until Blakely – should result in very little, if any, unwarranted disparate decision-making. 
                                                 
10
 The calculated odds ratio can be transformed by dividing the calculated odds ratio into 1 to obtain an inverse ratio 
of 1.934.  The greater the distance of the value of odds ratio below 1 yields a greater “negative” likelihood. 
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The hypotheses of this research, therefore, posited that the extralegal variables – race/ethnicity, gender, and age– 
would only have significant effects before Blakely but not after Blakely. If statistically significant relationships still 
exist after Blakely, it is suggested that the influence of extralegal factors should be weaker than before Blakely. 
 
Although the majority of cases in this study did not result in an upward departure, it was found that the odds of an 
upward departure was greater before Blakely than after Blakely. There was also some indication that extralegal 
factors influence the judge’s decision to aggravate the sentence above the sentence guideline range maximum.  
Although prior record score was found to be statistically significant in all models (i.e., baseline, pre-Blakely, and 
post-Blakely), other factors such as age and gender were also found to be statistically significant.  Substantively, 
other than the post-Blakely model, gender had the most substantive meaningful effect.  In the post-Blakely model, 
race/ethnicity (i.e., “other”) had the most substantively meaningful effect.   
 
The hypotheses regarding the influence of extralegal factors on aggravated sentencing were not supported in these 
findings. In other words, it was suggested that race/ethnicity, gender, age, and mode of conviction would not have an 
effect on the decision to aggravate the sentence above the sentence guideline range maximum after the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Blakely v. Washington. The results indicate that age and gender had an effect on the upward 
departure decision before and after the Blakely ruling.  
 
An area of research that does not garner the scholarly attention is in the area of prosecutorial discretion.  Given that 
the prosecutor holds great discretional authority in the American criminal court system and given that there is 
renewed restrictions on judicial discretional authority with the ruling in Blakely, the finding of disparate sentencing 
may be a somewhat muted result of disparate discretionary decision-making by the prosecutor. The discretional 
authority may have simply been displaced from the judge to the prosecutor. A prosecutor can have significant 
influence on sentencing decisions through charging and plea bargaining cases.   
 
Limitations 
 
This study’s findings should be taken as simply explorative.  One of the limitations of this study is a product of 
using secondary data; that is, there is an absence of relevant variables in the models. A key factor in a judge’s 
determination of aggravating a sentence or not is the type and/or strength of evidence brought forward.  Since the 
ruling in Blakely hinges on the evidence upon which the aggravated sentence is relied, it would be important to 
include these factors when constructing the proposed models.  The type of crime committed by the offender would 
be important to include since racial/ethnic differences are likely contextualized by crime type. Another factor not 
considered is whether a weapon was used or not during the commission of the crime. Type of attorney was also not 
included. The type of attorney – public or private – has also been found to play a role in sentencing decisions, with 
defendants assigned to public defenders more likely to receive more severe sentences than those with private 
attorneys (see Chiricos & Bales, 1991; Spohn, 2002). Another key variable missing from this dataset is the 
race/ethnicity of the judge. Steffensmeier and Britt (2001) suggested that, while there is considerable overlap in the 
sentences imposed by all judges, black judges are more likely to incarcerate defendants and their sentencing 
decisions are more punitive in nature.  
 
Another limitation is the lack of qualitative information about why judges aggravated sentences for particular 
defendants but not for others.  Including this information might give more insight about why judges impose 
aggravated sentences – or, upward departures. Starting dialogues with judges from Washington may glean more 
information on exactly what is taken into account when they decide to sentence an offender above that suggested by 
the sentence guidelines.  It would also be important to know why some extralegal variables – gender and age – still 
have an effect after Blakely. Due to the time constraints of this project, though, qualitative data were not collected.  
 
A final limitation is that data were only analyzed from one state. While the findings from this study can be 
generalized to other states with sentencing guidelines in a general way, the findings from this study cannot be 
generalized in a specific way. In other words, although sentencing guidelines are similar, there are enough 
differences to analyze data from each state to mete out important differences between states. For example, 
Washington’s sentencing guidelines are more narrowly defined than other states’ sentencing guidelines by already 
disallowing upward departures based on facts to prove an offense that was not formally charged (Frase, 2007). It is  
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possible, therefore, that important potential findings were masked using such a restrictive sentencing guideline state. 
It is also difficult to apply this research to non-sentence guideline states due to the differences in sentencing 
philosophies between guideline states and non-guideline states. 
 
In conclusion, Berman (2005) found a silver lining in the Blakely decision. Blakely caused major confusion in the 
conceptualization of sentencing; however, the problem is that the sentencing reform movement was underdeveloped 
in both theory and practice in the first place. The Blakely ruling offers a chance, in Berman’s (2005) opinion, to 
reconceptualize the modern sentencing reforms. He suggested that the sentencing revolution rejected rehabilitative 
theory and had lax administrative procedures for the application of a new sentencing structure, both of which have 
not been addressed by policymakers, courts, or academics (Berman, 2005). Regardless of one’s thoughts on Blakely, 
he argued that it should be praised for stimulating a national dialogue on sentencing policy, law procedures, and 
practices (Berman, 2005). With the swelling of both state and federal prison populations, new sentencing reforms 
are in order, and the dialogue started by Blakely may lead to drastic changes – especially if it is successful in further 
limiting judicial discretion and eliminating unwarranted disparity once and for all.  Frase (2007) suggested that one 
of these drastic changes might be creating voluntary sentencing guideline systems that were once presumptive. 
 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Blakely v. Washington further restricted judicial discretion by limiting the ability to 
depart above the predetermined sentencing guideline range. After this ruling, a judge must garner a factual 
determination of the facts upon which s/he can grant an upward departure. This study finds, in a formal way, that 
even though judicial discretion is further limited, disparities still exist in judges’ aggravated sentencing decisions. 
This study is explorative; more extensive research should continue to analyze the potential effects of the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Blakely v. Washington in sentencing guideline states on upward departures. 
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Table 1.  Codes and Frequencies of Dependent and Independent Variables for the Baseline Sample 
Variable  Code N % Mean 
Dependent Variable     
 Upward Departures 0 = no upward departure 2,198 50.0  
 
 
  
 
1 = upward departure 
 
2,198 50.0 
 
 
     
Independent Variables
 
    
Extralegal Variables     
 Race/ethnicity     
   0 = white 3,180 77.3  
   1 = black 554 13.5  
   
 
2 = Hispanic 184 4.5  
 
 
  3 = Other 197 4.8  
       
 Gender 0 = female 715 17.2  
   1 = male 3,449 82.8  
       
 Age  4,350  35.1 
       
 Mode of Conviction 
0 = plea 
1 = trial  
4,180 
216 
95.1 
4.9 
 
     
    Legal Variables     
 Offense Seriousness Score  4,396  2.79 
 Prior Record Score  4,396  2.62 
Note:  Numbers reflect missing cases and may not equal original sample size (n = 4,396). 
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Table 2. Frequencies of Dependent and Independent Variables for Pre- and Post-Blakely Samples 
    Pre-Blakely  Post-Blakely 
   N % Mean  N % Mean 
Dependent Variable         
 Upward Departures         
  No 1,210 44.7   988 58.6  
  Yes 1,499 55.3   699 41.4   
 
Independent Variables          
Extralegal Variables          
 Race/ethnicity          
  White 1,961 77.3   1,219 77.3   
  Black 340 13.4   214 13.6   
  Hispanic 117 4.6   67 4.2   
   Other 120 4.7   77 4.9   
 Gender         
  Female 425 16.6   290 18.1   
   Male 2,136 83.4   1313 81.9   
 Age    35.8    33.9 
 Mode of Conviction         
  Plea 2,536 93.6   1,644 97.5   
 Trial 173 6.4   43 2.5   
 
Legal Variables          
 Offense Severity Score    2.84    2.71 
 Prior Record Score    2.60    2.65 
Note:  Numbers reflect missing cases and may not equal original sample size. 
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Table 3. Logistic Regression Results for Baseline, Pre-Blakely, and Post-Blakely Samples 
 
Baseline  Pre-Blakely  Post-Blakely 
 
b Odds Ratio  b Odds Ratio  b Odds Ratio 
Blakely Timeline -0.525
*
 0.591  --   --  
(“Post-Blakely” = 1) (0.066)        
         
Offense Severity Score 0.029
*
 1.030  0.026 1.026  0.038 1.039 
 (0.013)   (0.016)   (0.021)  
Prior Record Score 0.042
*
 1.043  0.035
*
 1.036  0.056
*
 1.058 
 (0.012)   (0.015)   (0.018)  
Mode of Conviction 0.329
*
 1.390  0.263 1.300  0.606 1.834 
 (0.161)   (0.183)   (0.343)  
Age 0.017
*
 1.018  0.020
*
 1.020  0.013
*
 1.013 
 (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.005)  
Gender 0.661
*
 1.936  0.712
*
 2.038  0.573
*
 1.774 
 (0.087)   (0.110)   (0.142)  
Black -0.142 0.867  -0.165 0.848  -0.098 0.907 
 (0.095)   (0.121)   (0.153)  
Hispanic 0.058 1.059  0.255 1.290  -0.298 0.743 
 (0.156)   (0.201)   (0.265)  
Other -0.397
*
 0.672  -0.255 0.775  -0.660
*
 0.517 
 (0.154)   (0.193)   (0.266)  
Constant -1.099   -1.205   -1.446  
Nagelkerke R
2
 0.068   0.047   0.046  
N 4,396   2,709   1,687  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*p < .05 
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Table 4.  Differences in Slopes Test for Independent Samples 
 Pre-Blakely Sample  Post-Blakely Sample   
 b SE  b SE  Z score 
Prior Record Score 0.035 0.015  0.056 0.018  0.896 
Age 0.020 0.004  0.013 0.005  -1.093 
Gender 0.712 0.110  0.573 0.142  -0.774 
Other Race -0.225 0.193  -0.660 0.266  -1.324 
*p < .05 (two tailed) 
 
 
